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FIRST AXIS POWER SURRENDERS UNCONDITIONALLY

 

The Announcement made by General Eisenhower on September 8th 1943, that Italy had surrendered unconditionally did not mark the end of fighting in that unhappy country.

But it did mean a great easing of Allied problems and an add burden to Germany when she decided to defend the Italian peninsula.

The speech quoted below in which Mr Churchill related the diplomatic moves preceding Italy’s surrender, gave more satisfaction to the Empire than any wartime pronouncement of his had so far done.

 

Terms of the Armistice with Italy, Signed September 3rd which came into effect at 5-30pm. on September 8th 1943.

 

1.     Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by Italian armed forces.

2.     Italy will use its best endeavours to deny to the Germans facilities that might be used against the Allies.

3.     All prisoners or internees of the United Nations immediately to be turned over to the Allied C in C. and none may now, or at any time be evacuated to Germany.

4.     Immediate transfer to the Italian fleet and Italian aircraft to such. Points as may be designated by the Allied C. in C. with details of disarmament prescribed by him.

5.     Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied C. in C. to meet the need of the military and naval programme.

6.     Immediate surrender of Corsica and all Italian territory, both of islands and mainland, to the Allies for use as operational bases and other purposes as they may see fit.

7.     Immediate guarantee of free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of Italian territory by German forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian armed forces until this function is taken over by the Allies.

8.     The immediate withdrawal to Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war, from whatever area wherein they may now be engaged.

9.     Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all available forces to ensure prompt and exact compliance with all provisions of this armistice.

10.  The C. in C. of the Allied Forces reserves to himself the right to take any measures which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection and interests of the Allied Forces for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other actions as the C. in C. may require, and in particular, the C. in C. will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

11. The C.in C. Allied Forces will have full right to impose the measures of disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization.

12. Other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature, with which Italy will be bound to comply, will be transmitted at a later date.

13. The conditions of the present armistice will not be made public without the previous approval of the Allied C. in C. The English version will be the official text.

 

Mr Churchill speaks on Italy’s Unconditional Surrender in the House of Commons, September 21st 1943.

 

          On July 10th British and American armies, on the scale of perhaps 500,000 men, the first wave of whom were carried in upwards of 2,700 ships and landing craft, began their attack upon Sicily, and in a campaign of 38 days the entire island was conquered with loss to the enemy of 165,000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, or more than four times our Allied losses in the operation…

          July 25th was a memorable day.

          Even before we had half completed the conquest of Sicily or had set foot on the Italian mainland, the dictator Mussolini was overthrown and the Fascist regime, which had lasted for 21years, was cast down and vehemently repudiated by the whole mass of the Italian people.

          The Badoglio Government came into existence with the intention of making peace in accordance with the will of the nation.

          They were however intruded upon at all points and overlaid by the Germans, and they had the greatest difficulty in maintaining themselves against this hateful pressure.

          We know nothing about this new regime.

          Once Fascism was completely overthrown we were naturally anxious to find some authority with whom we could deal, so as to bring about the unconditional surrender of Italy in the shortest time and with the least possible cost in the blood of our soldiers.

          It was necessary to wait till the position became more definite.

          We therefore continued our preparations for the invasion in strength of the mainland of Italy on which we had resolved at the May Conference in Washington.

Presently, some feelers were put out by the new Italian Government through various channels asking for terms and explaining the deadly character of the difficulties in which they were involved…..

          We made the reply that the surrender must be unconditional.

          On August 15th the Italian envoy, an officer with the rack of general, called upon H.M. Ambassador at Madrid, Sir S.Hoare, with credentials proving that he came with full authority from Marshal Badoglio, and that he came to say that when the Allies landed in Italy the Italian Government were prepared to join them against Germany.

          With the approval of the War Cabinet, it was decided that General Eisenhower should send an American and British staff officer to meet the Italian envoy in Lisbon.

          We at once informed Premier Stalin of what was in progress.

          On August 19th the meeting in Lisbon took place.

          The envoy was informed that we could accept only unconditional surrender.

          He replied that the purpose of his visit was to discuss how Italy could join the United Nations in the war against Germany.

          The British and American offices replied that they were empowered to discuss only unconditional surrender.

          They were however, authorized and this was a decision which we took at Quebce to add that if at any time , anywhere in any circumstances , any Italian forces or people were found by our troops to be fighting Germans, we would immediately give them all possible aid.

          On August 23rd the Italian general departed …

          On August 31st the Italian envoy returned, He met General Eisenhower’s representatives at Syracuse.

          The Italian Government were willing to accept the terms unconditionally, but they did not see how they could carry them out in the teeth of the heavy German forces gathered near Rome and at many other points throughout the country….

          We did not doubt the sincerity of the envoy nor of his Government, but we were not able to reveal our military plans for the invasion of Italy.

          The real difficulty was that the Italians were powerless until we landed in strength, and we could not give them a date.

          We therefore timed the announcement for the moment which we deemed would give us the best military chance and them the best chance of extricating themselves from the German grip.

          This meant that the Armistice should be accorded only at the moment or just before our main descent.

          The terms were signed at Syracuse on the night of September 3rd….

          The Soviet Government, having studied the terms, authorized General Eisenhower to sign them in their name.

          Accordingly he did so not only on behalf of the United States and Great Britain but on behalf of the Soviet Government and of the United Nations…..

          Most strenuous efforts were made by all concerned to speed up our onfall….

          The date which had originally been the 15th was in fact brought forward to the 9th, the night of the 8th and 9th.

          Thus the whole of this operation was planned as a result of decisions taken before the fall of Mussolini and would have taken place whatever happened to Italy at the earliest possible moment.

          The Italian surrender was a windfall, but it had nothing to do with the date of harvesting the orchard.

          The truth is that the Armistice announcement was delayed to fit in with the attack and not the attack to fit in with the announcement….